4th Down – A Precarious Decision
The 4th down decision by American football coaches from Pop Warner to the NFL playoffs is nebulous. The extreme is successful Coach Kelley of Arkansas high school football – who never punts and has no punting practice nor punters on the team. Kelley plans to win and not playing not to lose. Kelley’s success rate on 4th down is quite high. Kelley also onside kicks instead of automatically kicking the ball to the opponent; and Kelly always attempts 2-point extra points. Avoiding punting in high profile high school, college, and professional teams would possibly lead to what happened to Coach Bengston – who followed Vince Lombardi. After struggling with the team for 3 years, a disgruntled fan hung his dog on the clothesline in Green Bay. How anyone has that on their conscience for life is beyond contemplation (prayers).
Several factors are decisive in going for a 4th down - including the score, field position, time of game, successful history of converting 4th downs, your defense able to stop opponent if no conversion, and player personnel. The head coach generally makes the call along with the offensive coordinator. Some teams call timeout to discuss the situation, while others play quickly or no-huddle. Most teams have a set play for 4th down – depending on the yardage. If it is within 2 yards for a 1st down, then many teams run or play action – keeping the defense off-guard. The NFL allowed a Tush-Push in 2005 – allowing players to push others forward (disallowing pulling, lifting, or carrying another player on your team to advance the football). Many other leagues disallow pushing players.
The NFL on 4th and 1 in 2024 converted 88%; while the year before it was 70%. Overall 4th down statistics were 45 % success in the 90s. Overall statistics on 4th down (all yardage in the NFL) was 57% in 2024. Some 4th downs non-punting are at the end of games when the outcome is statistically a defeat. Thus, the element of risk is approximately .5 overall. Since kickers in all leagues have stronger feet; the balance when a team is in plus territory (across the 50-yard line), is kicking a field goal v scoring 7 points. If the field goal is missed, the opposition obtains the ball either from scrimmage or where the kick was attempted – so field goals are an additional risk with an inconsistent kicker.
The adage is that to win football games consistently, TDs are needed. The NFL averages 9-point disparities in games; yet many games are won or lost on failed points (from lack of kicking a field goal to missing a 4th down attempt). The reality is that within the NFL, 70% of games are one score games entering the 4th quarter. Red Zone (within opponent’s 20-yard line) conversion of TDs is 60% in the NFL in total. The success rate of scoring a TD has for years matched the yardage upon which the offensive drive began (if it was the 10-yard line in your own territory, the odds of scoring a TD were 10%). Driving the length of the field and facing a 4th and 2 on the 15-yard line becomes not a crime to kick a field goal and convert the drive into points (you may win the game). The offense feels as if they just drove successfully 75 yards and deserve points.
Defenses (especially near the end zone) squeeze teams (shorter field), blitz, confuse the offense, and depending on the yardage have up to 9 defensive men in the box (linebackers and defensive line). Obviously, there is one-on-one coverage for the receivers; so, a pass is statistically about 60% converted (average passing efficiency). A fade end-zone pass in college, and the NFL is 15% success. I cringe when a fade pass is attempted. The only bail-out is PI (Pass interference). When I watch a fade develop, I grab a sandwich and coke while grumbling; and then quietly say just give the ball to the opposition. I have seen less than the number of toes I have counted on myself of fade end zone conversions. I abhor the fade route in the end zone – no matter what down.
Metrics and analytics from computers on teams guide 4th down decisions. Many announcers when teams face 4th down remark that going for a first down in this situation goes against analytics. A hot tailback and offensive line guides coaches to a running play with higher percentages. The analytics, however, with a consistent kicker within decent range (45 yards) is 86%. The gray area occurs when the ball is near the opponents 35-yard line (a long field attempt – 52 yards). Field goal percentages decline drastically beyond 50 yards to < 5% success rate beyond 60 yards. Punting the ball into the end zone is only a 15-yard gain for your team from the 35-yard line. A pooch punt inside the 10 is variably successful. Aiming for the coffin corner is problematic. A drop-kick is never practiced; though legal. As a youth everyone drop kicked until they met their high school coach. Kids were quite good at the lost art; but this was a different age. Jim Thorpe purportedly kicked an 80-yard field goal with a drop kick – but Thorpe was superhuman. This is never discussed because football was in its toddler stage during Thorpe’s time; and nobody believes the kick without film. The NFL record by Cam Little is 68 yards; and soon it will be 70 yards (probably in Denver).
Retrieving in my mind all the data, history of football, excellent kickers, and watching a ton of misguided coaching decisions about 4th down, I have concluded that kicking a field goal within 50 yards in college and pro leagues makes the most sense on 4th down (barring under a yard to go). A few teams can master the Tush-Push; but defenses are rapidly countering this perhaps soon to be obsolete play. Score points – football is not a 3-point affair like basketball. Drives and chances of scoring are few in American football. A successful field goal wins games; and statistically makes the team feel good with points scored after grueling offensive drives. I would plan my team in attempting to make 10 yards in 3 plays (3.3 yards/play) with offensive plays (running/passing/trick/etc.). My 3rd down is my 4th down. If I cannot make 10 yards in 3 downs, I statistically will not make a 4th down; and I will come up empty – defeating scoring, team morale, and possibly losing the game.
Concluding, barring a 4th and a foot scenario with the ball past the 35-yard line of the opponent, kick a field goal on 4th down. Pooch punt between the 35 and 50-yard line; and a regular punt from behind the 50-yard line comes with 4th down strategy. Score points; not misery. Compete and take the 3.